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Abstract
Academic research is a public good whose production is supported by the tuition-
paying students that a faculty’s research accomplishments attract. A professor’s
spot contribution to the university’s revenues thus depends not on her spot research
production, but rather on her cumulative research record. We show that a profit-
maximizing university will apply a ‘high’ minimum retention standard to the produc-
tion of a junior professor who has no record of past research, but a ‘zero’ retention
standard to the spot production of a more senior professor whose background includes
accomplishments sufficient to have cleared the ‘high’ probationary hurdle.
I Introduction
Under a tenure-track contract, a professor who fails to meet some positive standard of
research production during a finite probationary period is dismissed at that period’s end.
Yet, a professor who meets that initial standard is granted tenure and retained regardless
of her research output thereafter.1
The literature offers a number of possible economic rationales for the university’s puz-
zling contractual choice. Freeman [8] suggests that risk averse professors are granted the
security of tenure to compensate for the risk inherent in their research. 2 Yet, this expla-
nation is unsatisfactory, for nonacademic employers manage to contract with workers who
∗Cater and Lew: Department of Economics, Trent University, Ontario, Canada; Pivato: Department
of Mathematics, Trent University, Ontario, Canada.
1Siow [25] notes that, in the 1989 Survey Among College and University Faculty sponsored by the
Carnegie Foundation Survey, 4.7 percent and 36.4 percent of tenured faculty in doctoral-granting and non-
doctoral-granting schools, respetively, reported no publications in the previous two years and no current
research. Yet, in reviews of U.S. case law, legal scholars, including Hendrickson [10] and Morris [21], do
not cite a single case in which a tenured professor was dismissed primarily on the grounds of low research
productivity.
2Kahn and Huberman [14] and Waldman [26] offer explanations of the use of ‘up-or-out’ contracts,
but do not address the issue of post-probationary minimum production standards. McKenzie [19] and
McPherson and Shapiro [20] attempt to academic tenure on internal political, rather than economic,
grounds.
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are risk averse and whose productivity is uncertain without having to offer them anything
akin to tenure.
Carmichael [4] suggests that a university is unique in that, because the state of academic
knowledge is vast and expanding, it is the incumbent occupants of its scarce faculty slots
who are best positioned to judge the research potential of candidates. With the aim of
maximizing its research production, the university then provides those incumbents with the
security of tenure to ensure that they are willing to identify and hire candidates superior
to themselves. Yet, senior faculty from other institutions are just as qualified to rank
candidates. There is, therefore, no reason why a university could not enlist externals to
assess its applicants in much the same way as it utilizes them to evaluate its tenure and
promotion cases.3 The cost of doing so would surely pale in comparison to the foregone
research output that results when scarce faculty slots are occupied, perhaps for decades,
by unproductive scholars. Moreover, in focusing on the issue of incentives in hiring,
Carmichael’s [4] approach assumes that a professor’s research productivity is governed
only by ability, and not effort, and that ability is constant over a professor’s lifetime. In
doing so, it abstracts from a question at the heart of the tenure debate: why is academic
research output observed to decline, on average, with age?4 Critics, including Alchian
[1], have long suggested that this pattern reflects some disincentive effect of the tolerance
tenure extends. But if that were so, it seems unlikely that a university would choose to
grant tenure. Could declining research production instead be understood to be optimal
in some way?
Siow [25] assumes that production declines because research productivity falls with age,
arguing that, as this occurs, it becomes socially efficient for a professor to spend less time
on research and more time on teaching. Tenure is the means by which the university then
induces its older professors to do less research. Yet, while research production declines
with age, there is no empirical evidence to support an assumption that academic research
productivity declines as well. How, then, should falling research production be understood?
Moreover, it is not clear that Siow’s theory can be fully reconciled with the observed facts.
If the goal of tenure were to eliminate research effort among older faculty, we would not
observe universities providing even tenured professors with considerable research incentives.
On the other hand, if a university’s goal were to merely reduce research effort among its
older faculty, it might tolerate reduced production, but not utter failure.
The purpose of this paper is to develop a model of the unique way in which a university
translates its research production into profits, and to show that such a model can explain
why a university would retain only those professors who are initially successful in research,
regardless of their research output thereafter, and continue to induce research effort, albeit
at a rate that declines with the professor’s age.
We suggest that the key to the tenure puzzle may lie in a number of observations
regarding the nature of academic productivity and tenure itself.
A primary role of a university is to encourage research that is important, but would
not be elsewhere undertaken. As Carmichael [4] notes, this includes the production of
3This point was first made by Ceci, Williams and Mueller-Johnson [6].
4Empirical evidence of declining research production is presented in Diamond [7] and Levin and Stephan
[16].
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knowledge that either cannot be appropriated or is of no value to private sector firms, such
as that generated by research in the fields of philosophy, literature, public policy and pure
mathematics. While a professor is hired to both research and instruct, it is, therefore,
only her instruction that is sold.5
How is it, then, that a university can afford to reward research accomplishments? One
might argue that a university is not subject to the same economic pressures that constrain
other employers; that a university does not care about profits. Yet, while Hendrickson
[10] and Morris [21] do not cite a single case in which a tenured professor was dismissed
primarily on the grounds of low research productivity, as noted above, they, along with
Lovain [17], do cite cases in which tenured professors have been dismissed for failing to
perform their teaching duties. This clearly suggests that a university is concerned with the
realization of revenues and with its own economic viability. More plausibly, the production
of academic research may be viable because, as observers, including Bok [3], James [13]
and Hearn [9], suggest, it benefits a university by attracting tuition-paying students. Siow
[24] presents supporting evidence that students interpret observed research output as a
signal that a university’s faculty have the knowledge they seek.6
Combining these observations, we model a professor’s contribution to the university’s
revenues, at any point, as depending not on her spot research production, but rather on
the strength of her cumulative research record. A representative university operates in
discrete time and aims to maximize its expected profits per period. Its problem, in general
terms, involves choosing both the conditions under which it will retain an incumbent into
the next period and the extent to which it will reward research accomplishments so as to
induce a professor’s unobservable research effort.
We show, for a range of distributions of research productivity, that the particular
tolerance of tenure can be understood not as the solution to some hiring problem or as
a way of inducing less research, but as the means by which the university retains those
professors whose current research production may be poor or nonexistent, but whose past
research accomplishments continue to make them profitable. We also show that declining
research production over the life cycle need not result from some disincentive effect of tenure
or from declining productivity. Falling production can be understood to result from the
university optimally inducing less research effort as a professor approaches retirement and
the opportunities to realize tuition revenues from any resulting research successes diminish.
This paper is related to Cater, Lew and Smith [5], which examines a simpler model in
which research productivity is governed only by ability, not effort, and in which that ability
is assumed to decline with age. The university’s problem in that paper thus involves choos-
ing only the conditions under which an incumbent will be retained into the next period.
The main contribution of this paper is our consideration of a much more general model
that allows for the simultaneous analysis of the university’s choices of optimal research
5Note that Carmichael [4] assumes that a professor is hired only to research.
6Research may be a reliable proxy for knowledge either because knowledge is accumulated through
research or because knowledge makes it easier to conduct research. Of course, students need not observe
and process the research directly for the signal to be effective. Scholarly accomplishments of a university’s
faculty may filter down to students through media sources that rank universities, in part, on the basis of
those accomplishments and their correlates.
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standards and research effort inducement. The analysis presented here enables us to fully
resolve the contractual puzzle described above.
II The model
A representative university
We conceive of a government or private donor providing a one-time capital endowment to
create a representative university under the terms of a charter that directs it, in perpetuity,
to produce and impart academic knowledge. The endowed capital is sufficient to support
a fixed number of faculty ‘slots’. Without loss of generality, we let that number be one.
Once endowed, the university is expected to be financially independent. It is risk
neutral and has a zero rate of discount. Operating in discrete time, it expects to live for
infinitely many periods, remaining viable by maximizing its expected profits per period.7
The university’s only revenues are ‘tuitions’, defined here to include any revenues tied
to student enrollment.8 The university’s only costs are the wages of its faculty.
Hiring and retention decisions can be made only at the beginning of a period. The
university can condition a professor’s wages on her observable research output. Its em-
ployment contracts are enforceable before the courts.
A representative professor
Professors are drawn from overlapping generations, each with a working lifetime of three
periods. Those in their first, second and third periods will be referred to, respectively, as
being ‘junior’, ‘middle-aged’ and ‘senior’. All professors are identical ex ante.
In each period of her working life, a representative professor will occupy either a nonaca-
demic or an academic job. The option of nonacademic employment always exists; as in
Carmichael [4], its per period maximized utility is a constant Co. If a professor chooses the
nonacademic option at the beginning of any period, we, like Carmichael [4], assume that
her academic abilities decay so that, in any subsequent period, nonacademic employment
will be her only option.9
At the beginning of her first working period, our representative professor receives one
offer of academic employment. If she accepts that offer, then, at the beginning of the
second period, the university that employed her as a ‘junior’ may wish to retain her.
Outside universities may also attempt to hire her, and a bidding war for her services may
7Rothschild and White [23] and Siow [25] also assume that a university seeks to maximize profits.
8Our model thus applies both to privately-endowed schools where tuitions are typically paid entirely
by the students and to publicly-endowed universities where tuitions may be subsidized, in part or in full,
by a government.
Note also that while research production may lead to subsequent grant income, we will abstract from this
possibility to focus on the question of why tenure is granted both by universities that frequently realize
such income and by universities that rarely, if ever, do.
9This is a simplifying assumption that rules out the possibilities of delayed or discontinuous academic
employment.
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occur. A similar process then occurs at the beginning of the third period if she remains
in academic employment through her second working period.10
If employed by a university during the tth period of her working life (t = 1, 2, 3), our
representative professor will, at the beginning of that period, choose an unobservable level
of research effort, et (≥ 0), the quadratic utility cost of which is e2t . At the end of
the period she will then realize research output described by a single index that, as in
Carmichael [4], measures quantity and quality with the correct weights. The value of that
index, rt, is drawn randomly from the probability distribution ρet on [0,∞) that is assumed
to come from either the uniform, exponential or power-law family of distributions.11 As
in Carmichael [4], any knowledge accumulated through, or otherwise associated with, aca-
demic research is of no value in nonacademic employment. During any period of academic
employment, our representative professor will also provide instruction, the disutility of
which is a constant D. We normalize the professor’s utility scale so that Co +D = 0.
Our most critical assumption is that a professor’s period t research output serves as a
signal of knowledge that increases her contribution to the tuition revenues of any university
that employs her in any subsequent period. Because all ‘junior’ professors in our model
begin with no research record, they all contribute the same revenues during the first period
of their working lives. We normalize those revenues to 0. The translation of observed
research output into subsequent revenues is assumed to be linear: a ‘middle-aged’ and a
‘senior’ professor contribute kr1 and k(r1 + r2), respectively (where k > 0).
12
Our representative professor is risk neutral and has a zero rate of discount. Her
constant marginal utility of money is normalized to 1. In choosing between alternative
employment offers, she will, therefore, attempt to maximize her expected lifetime income,
less any research effort disutility.
At the beginning of the first period of her working life, our representative professor is
assumed to accept the academic offer, provided that it matches or betters the expected
lifetime utility of 0 she would obtain from a lifetime of nonacademic employment. Because
of infinitesimally small but positive job change costs, an academic job which offers an
expected future utility of 0 is similarly sufficient to deter a ‘middle-aged’ or ‘senior’ professor
from quitting to pursue nonacademic employment. Those job change costs also mean that,
for one university to successfully raid another university for a ‘middle-aged’ or ‘senior’
professor, the recruiting university must slightly better the (expected) wage she would
receive by remaining with her current employer.
10Note that, in our model, because a professor’s research record is publicly observable, there is no mean-
ingful distinction between an outside university raiding for a professor and a professor seeking employment
with an outside university. It is, therefore, sufficient to consider only the implications of raiding.
11These three probability distributions, each intuitively plausible and analytically tractable, are chosen
to demonstrate that our results are robust across a range of models of intellectual creativity.
12There may be rare cases where a university continues to realize revenues from its association with a
particularly accomplished professor even after her retirement. We abstract from this possibility, however,
on the grounds that the use of tenure-track contracts seems to transcend such cases.
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III Analysis
Academic contracts
Any equilibrium in our model necessarily involves at least some universities hiring ‘junior’
professors at least some of the time. The terms of employment offered to a ‘junior’ will
not only determine whether she accepts the initial academic offer, but will also play a
role in determining the relative value of her nonacademic and potential academic options
in subsequent periods. It is, therefore, necessary for us to first describe the terms of
employment that a ‘junior’ professor will be offered.
When attempting to hire a ‘junior’, a university must choose two inter-related features
of its employment contract: (1) the conditions, if any, under which it wishes to retain the
professor into subsequent periods of her working life and (2) the wage structure necessary
to recruit her initially, to induce her ‘optimal’ effort, and to ensure that she chooses to
remain with the university when her retention is sought.
We make a number of assumptions about the contractual form. The university sets min-
imum research standards that a professor’s most recent research realization must equal or
exceed for her to be given the option of remaining. This structure admits the tenure-track
sequence of ‘spot’ standards as a possible (partial) solution to the university’s problem,
but in no way restricts the values of those standards. The university also adopts a simple
variant of the linear incentive model of Holmstrom and Milgron [12], whereby it pays a
base wage as well as a bonus that is linear in research output.13 Our general payment
structure places no restrictions on the timing of research bonuses, allowing them to be
paid, if at all, immediately upon the research realization and/or in any subsequent period
of retention.
The academic contract offered to a ‘junior’ professor is thus a structure, C := (w1, w2,
w3; b1, b2; b21, b31, b32; s1, s2), comprised of base wages (w1, w2, w3), bonus multipliers (b1,
b2; b21, b31, b32), and retention standards (s1, s2).
A professor who accepts C will receive a salary of
S1(r1) := w1 + b1r1 (1)
at the end of her first period of employment. In the event that her first research draw r1
≥ s1, she then has the option of remaining with the university through her second period.
If she chooses to remain, she receives a salary of
S2(r1, r2) := w2 + b2r2 + b21r1 (2)
at the end of that period. Similarly, if her r2 ≥ s2, she is given the option of remaining
with the university through the third and final period of her working life. If she takes that
13In Macleod and Malcomson [18], Pearce and Stacchetti [22], and Hogan [11], a similar base-plus-bonus
payment scheme is considered. In those models, only the base wage is part of the explicit contract; the
bonus for unobservable effort and is promised only ‘implicitly’, but, in repeated interaction, it is in the
best interest of the firm to honor even the implicit component. Here, where the bonus is tied to observable
research output, both the base wage and bonus components are explicit.
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option, she receives a salary of
S3(r1, r2) := w3 + b31r1 + b32r2. (3)
at that period’s end. Note that the contract contains no bonus for r3. Because the
professor’s working life ends immediately after any r3 draw, that draw results in no ad-
ditional revenues for the university, making it obvious that payment of a bonus for that
draw will never be profitable. Note also that our contract’s general payment structure
places no restrictions on the timing of research bonuses, allowing them to be paid, if at all,
immediately upon the research realization and/or in any subsequent period of retention.
A number of definitions are useful. For any level of research effort, e (≥ 0), let r(e) :=∫∞
0
r dρe[r] be the expected value of r. For any s ≥ 0, let
P (e, s) :=
∫ ∞
s
dρe[r] and R(e, s) :=
1
P (e, s)
∫ ∞
s
r dρe[r] (4)
be, respectively, the probability that r ≥ s, and the expected value of r, given that r ≥ s.
We define the net benefit for the professor during period t to be the net benefit of
remaining employed by this university under contract C, rather than quitting to nonaca-
demic employment. (We will deal with the possibility of quitting to another university
later.) The expected net benefit she extracts from C depends upon the effort she exerts.
A professor’s incentives
To maximize her lifetime expected net benefit under C, the professor must choose optimal
effort levels for each period; to do this, she must solve a dynamic programming problem,
starting with period 3 and working backward.
Period 3. – Suppose the professor has been retained C through the first two periods
of her career, and that her r2 ≥ s2. If she were to remain with the university, then, in the
absence of any bonus for third period research production, her optimal e3 would be 0, so
the net benefit of remaining with this university for the third period of her career would
be
NB3(r1, r2) (3) w3 + b31r1 + b32r2. (5)
To ensure that the professor would not instead choose to pursue nonacademic employment,
we require:
NB3(r1, r2) ≥ 0, ∀ r1, r2 ≥ 0. (6)
Period 2. – Now suppose that a professor has completed the first period of C, that her
r1 ≥ s1˙, and that (6) is satisfied. The expected net benefit of choosing to remain with the
university for (at least) the second period of her working life would be
NB2,3(r1, e2) = NB2(r1, e2) + P (e2, s2) NB3(r1, e2). (7)
Here,
NB2(r1, e2) := w2 + b2r(e2) + b21r1 − e22 (8)
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is the net benefit of period 2 employment alone, while
NB3(r1, e2) := w3 + b31r1 + b32R(e2, s2).
is the expected value of (5), given period-2 effort e2. If the professor were to choose to
remain with the university, she would then choose her optimal level of period-2 research
effort, e∗2, so as to maximize (7). For the university to ensure that a professor will not
pursue her nonacademic option at this stage, the contract must satisfy
NB2,3(r1, e
∗
2) ≥ 0, ∀ r1 ≥ 0. (9)
Period 1. – Suppose (6) and (9) are satisfied. For a ‘junior’ professor, aware that her
period-2 research effort will be e∗2, the expected net benefit of the academic contract, given
period-1 effort e1, is
NB1,2,3(e1, e
∗
2) = NB1(e1) + P (e1, s1) NB2,3(e1, e
∗
2). (10)
Here,
NB1(e1) := w1 + b1r(e1)− e21 (11)
is the net benefit of period 1 alone, while
NB2,3(e1, e
∗
2) := w2+b2r(e
∗
2)+b21R(e1, s1)−(e∗2)2+P (e∗2, s2)
(
w3 + b31R(e1, s1) + b32R(e
∗
2, s2)
)
is the expected value of (7), given period-1 effort e1 and anticipating optimal period-
2 effort e∗2. If the ‘junior’ professor were to accept the academic contract, she would
choose her optimal level of period-1 research effort, e∗1, so as to maximize (10). It will
be rational for the potential ‘junior’ professor to accept the academic offer if and only if
NB1,2,3(e
∗
1, e
∗
2) ≥ 0.
To the university, w1 represents a cost that has no influence on the professor’s choice of
effort profile, (e∗1, e
∗
2). To minimize its costs, the university will set w1 := −b1r(e∗1)+(e∗1)2−
P (e∗1, s1) NB2,3(e
∗
1, e
∗
2), so that the contract satisfies the minimal recruitment condition:
NB1,2,3(e
∗
1, e
∗
2) = 0. (12)
We will say that C is admissible if it satisfies (6), (9) and (12). Period-specific expected
profits, as of the beginning of each of the contract’s three periods, are then given by:
Π1 = −w1 − b1r(e∗1), (13)
Π2(r1) = −w2 − b2r(e∗2) + (k − b21)r1 and (14)
Π3(r1, r2) = −w3 + (k − b31)r1 + (k − b32)r2. (15)
Academic raiding
In addition to the issue of admissibility, a university that hires a ‘junior’ professor need
also consider the possibility that it could be raided for its ‘middle-aged’ and/or ‘senior’
professors by another university.
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Lazear [15], Bernhardt and Scoones [2] and Waldman [26] each describe a situation
where one firm initially employs a worker and where that worker may be raided by an
outside firm. Each of those papers establish that raiding will occur only if the worker is
a better match with the outside firm; where match-quality is equal across the firms, the
initial employer creates a contract to pre-empt raiding.
In our model, there is no match-quality heterogeneity. A professor has no preference
for one university over another, and, conditional on her research record, she would gen-
erate the same revenues for any university that employs her. If an admissible C were
then to, say, induce research effort by rewarding research output immediately and strictly
upon the realization of that output, its profits would be ‘back-loaded’, and a strategy of
raiding ‘middle-aged’ and ‘senior’ professors by offering slightly higher wages than those
set out under C would earn the outside university higher profits per period than the initial
employer. Even if the initial employer were to thwart the outside university by matching
its offer, the initial employer’s profits would be reduced. But if C were instead charac-
terized by ‘back-loaded’ wages, profits would be ‘front-loaded’ and a strategy of raiding
‘middle-aged’ and ‘senior’ professors by offering slightly higher wages than defined under C
would earn the outside university lower profits per period than those earned by the initial
employer.
We can thus proceed under the assumption that all universities will operate in a raid-
proof equilibrium where each adopts a strategy of recruiting ‘junior’ professors using a
back-loaded or ‘raid-proof’ wage structure that acts to pre-empt raiding.
We say that the contract C is strongly raid-proof if, for all r1, r2 ≥ 0, we have Π2(r1) ≤ Π1
and Π3(r1, r2) ≤ Π1, where these quantities are as defined in equations (13-15). (Note
that ‘strong’ raid-proofing is sufficient, but not necessary, to make C raid-proof.)
The optimal contract
We say that a contract is tenure-track if s1 > 0 and s2 = 0 (or, equivalently, 0 < P (e1, s1) <
1 and P (e2, s2) = 1 for any e1, e2 ≥ 0). We say that the contract induces a declining effort
profile if e∗1 > e
∗
2.
Our principle result can now be stated as follows.
Theorem 1 Assume a raid-proof environment. Let {ρe}e∈R 6− be a family of probability
distributions on [0,∞), and let C be an admissible, raid-proof contract that maximizes
expected profits per period.
(a) For all e ≥ 0, suppose ρe is the uniform probability distribution on [0, e]. (That
is, dρe(r) = 1/e if r ∈ [0, e] and dρe(r) = 0 if r > e.) Then C is tenure-track, with a
declining effort profile.
(b) For all e ≥ 0, suppose ρe is the exponential probability distribution dρe(r) =
1
e
exp(−r/e). Then C is tenure-track, with a declining effort profile.
(c) For any α > 1 and e ≥ 0, let ραe be the power law distribution dραe (r) = e
α α
(e+x)α+1
.
There exist α, α ∈ (1,∞) such that, if α ∈ (1, α) or α ∈ (α,∞), then C is tenure-
track, with a declining effort profile. In particular, this holds if α = 2.
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In the above, we see that the maximization of profits leads the university both to adopt
a tenure-track contract and to induce declining effort that results in research production
declining, on average, over the life cycle.
The intuition is straightforward. In each of the first and second periods of the contract,
the university will apply the same rule: induce a professor’s research effort up to the point
where the resulting marginal revenue product (MRP) is equal to the (increasing) marginal
cost. But because more revenues can be realized from the first research draw than from
the second, the optimal level of induced research effort declines from the first to the second
period. Accordingly, research output will, on average, decline with age.
In choosing the retention standard to apply at the beginning of each of the second and
third periods, the university faces a trade-off: increasing the minimum standard applied
to the most recent research draw raises the conditional mean payoff associated with the
remaining periods of the contract, but it involves foregoing any benefit from the past
research accomplishments of those who fail to meet the current standard. For a professor
entering the second period of her working life, whose first research draw will influence
both second and third period profitability and who has no record of past accomplishments,
a relatively high minimum standard is optimal. But for a professor entering her third
period, whose second research draw will influence only third period profitability and whose
background includes the accomplishments necessary to have cleared the high first standard,
the university optimally tolerates little or even no research output on the professor’s part.14
IV Outline of Theorem 1 proof
The proof of Theorem 1 is long and appears in the appendix. This section, however,
describes the basis for that proof and outlines the major steps involved. (Detailed proofs
of all statements appear in the Appendix.)
Recall that our representative university operates in a raid-proof equilibrium. In any
period, the university will find itself in one of three ‘states’: its single faculty ‘slot’ will be
occupied by a ‘junior’ professor (state 1), a ‘middle-aged’ professor (state 2), or a ‘senior’
professor (state 3). Whenever a ‘junior’ (‘middle-aged’) incumbent is retained into the
following period, the university will transition from state 1 (2) to state 2 (3). If the
university cannot ‘raid’ from other universities, then it can only hire junior professors;
thus, whenever any incumbent is not retained into the following period, the university
returns to state 1. If other universities will not ‘raid’ from our representative university,
then the probability of retaining a professor is exactly the probability that her research
exceeds the minimum standards s1 and s2 specified by the contract. Thus, the retention
probabilities are p1 := P (e
∗
1, s1) and p2 := P (e
∗
2, s2). This data defines a 3-state Markov
14Because, in our model, inducing research contributes to revenues only ex post, and only on the condition
that the worker is retained, it can be thought of as being analogous to a nonacademic employer’s investment
in training a worker. Indeed, our story can be thought of as being akin to one where the optimal rate
of the training investment diminishes as the worker approaches retirement, and where the employer will
not tolerate a worker who fails in his initial training, but will tolerate a worker who initially reaches an
acceptable level of productivity, even if his productivity then ceases to increase any further.
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process with transition probability matrix 1− p1 p1 01− p2 0 p2
1 0 0
 . (16)
This process has stationary probability distribution (pi1, pi2, pi3) given by
pi1 =
1
1 + p1 + p1p2
, pi2 =
p1
1 + p1 + p1p2
, and pi3 =
p1p2
1 + p1 + p1p2
. (17)
Recall that equation (14) gave the expected value of Π2 at the start of period 2 —i.e. once
the realization of r1 is already known. Likewise, (15) gave the expected value of Π3 at
the start of period 3, when the realizations of r1 and r2 are both known. However, at the
start of period 1, the future values of r1 and r2 are both unknown; at this moment, the
expected profits which C will generate in each of three periods of a professor’s career are
Π1 (13) −w1 − b1r(e∗1);
Π2 (14) −w2 − b2r(e∗2) + (k − b21)R(e∗1, s1);
and Π3 (15) −w3 + (k − b31)R(e∗1, s1) + (k − b32)R(e∗2, s2).
(18)
Combining (18) and (17), the expected profit per period of the university is given by
Π( C) := pi1Π1 + pi2Π2 + pi3Π3. (19)
The university must find the (raid-proof) contract which maximizes the value of Π. The
proof of Theorem 1 now proceeds in three steps:
1. We relax the need to optimize over raid-proof contracts, by showing that a non-
raidproof contract can be ‘retroactively raidproofed’ without affecting its optimality.
2. We show that it suffices to solve the optimization problem over a particularly nice
class of contracts we call MNQ (‘marginal no-quitting’).
3. We establish Theorem 1 for the class of MNQ contracts.
Steps 1 and 2 both use the concept of contract equivalence. Let C and C˜ be two academic
contracts. We say that C and C˜ are equivalent if:
(Eq1) In both contracts, the professor’s optimal effort profile (e∗1, e
∗
2) is the same.
(Eq2) Both contracts have the same research standards (s1, s2).
(Eq3) Both contracts yield the same expected lifetime net benefit NB1,2,3 for the professor.
In particular, (Eq2) implies that C is tenure-track if and only if C˜ is also tenure-track.
(Eq3) implies that C satisfies minimal recruitment condition (12) if and only if C˜ does.
Lemma 2 If contracts C and C˜ are equivalent, then both contracts yield the same value
of Π in equation (19). (Thus, C is Π-maximizing if and only if C˜ is.) 2
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The next proposition accomplishes Step 1 in our proof strategy. Recall that r(e) :=∫∞
0
r dρe[r].
Proposition 3 Assume r′(e) 6= 0 for all e ≥ 0. Let C be any admissible, tenure-track
contract which is not raid-proof. There exists an admissible, raid-proof contract C˜ which
is equivalent to C (and hence, is also tenure-track). 2
Proposition 3 says that, to demonstrate that the raid-proof Π-maximizing contract is
tenure-track, it suffices to first find a non-raid-proof contract which maximizes Π by being
tenure-track, because we can always ‘retroactively raidproof’ it later.
We will focus on a class of contracts which are especially easy to optimize. We say that
C is a minimal no-quitting (MNQ) contract if the conditions (6) and (9) are satisfied with
equalities —that is,
NB2,3(r1, e
∗
2) = 0, and NB3(r1, r2) = 0, ∀ r1, r2 ≥ 0. (MNQ)
If C satisfies (MNQ), then NB2,3 = NB2 and NB1,2,3 = NB1; this will make it much
easier to characterize (and control) the professor’s utility-maximizing effort profile (e∗1, e
∗
2).
Define β : (0,∞)−→(0,∞) by β(e) := 2e/r′(e) for all e > 0. We will require the family of
distributions {ρe}e∈R 6− to satisfy the following assumption:
β is a bijection from (0,∞) to (0,∞). (B)
One way to satisfy (B) is for β to be strictly increasing, with lim
e↘0
β(e) = 0, and lim
e↗∞
β(e) =
∞. This just means that there are not strongly increasing returns to effort —a very weak
assumption. It is easy to check that all the distribution families in Theorem 1 satisfy (B).
The next proposition accomplishes Step 2 in our strategy.
Proposition 4 Suppose {ρe}e∈R 6− satisfies (B).
(a) Let C be any contract satisfying minimal recruitment condition (12). There is a
MNQ contract C˜ equivalent to C.
(b) Let C be a profit-maximizing contract in the space of all admissible contracts.
Let C˜ be a profit-maximizing contract in the space of all admissible MNQ contracts.
Then C˜ provides the same expected profit per period as C. 2
If hypothesis (B) holds, then Proposition 4(b) implies that, to find the Π-maximizing
contract, it suffices to maximize Π over the set of admissible MNQ contracts. For any MNQ
contract, it can be shown that b12 = b13 = b23 = w3 = 0, while the values of w1 and w2 are
entirely determined by b1 and b2 (see Lemma A in the Appendix). Thus, an MNQ contract
has only four free parameters: b1, b2, s1, and s2. Furthermore, we can achieve any desired
effort profile (e1, e2) and retention probabilities (p1, p2) with a suitable choice of parameters
(b1, b2; s1, s2) (see Lemma B in the Appendix). Thus, the space of MNQ contracts can be
parameterized by the set of all 4-tuples (e1, e2; p1, p2). When an MNQ contract is expressed
in this form, Π can be expressed as a function Π(e1, e2; p1, p2). With a mild technical
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assumption, we can then define functions e∗1 : [0, 1]
2−→R6− and e∗2 : [0, 1]2−→R6− such that,
for any fixed (p1, p2), the values of the parameters (e1, e2) which maximize Π(e1, e2; p1, p2)
are e∗1(p1, p2) and e
∗
2(p2) (see Lemma C). At this point, the Π-maximization problem is
reduced to finding the values of p∗1 and p
∗
2 in [0, 1] which maximize the function Πˆ(p1, p2) :=
Π[e∗1(p1, p2), e
∗
2(p1, p2); p1, p2]. If the family of probability distributions {ρe}e∈R 6− and the
derivative ∂2 Πˆ satisfy certain technical conditions, then the Πˆ-maximizing value of p2 is
p∗2 = 1 —in other words, the Π-maximizing MNQ contract is tenure track (see Lemma
E(a)). Furthermore, if p∗1 and p
∗
2 then satisfy certain conditions (in particular, if p
∗
1 > 1/2)
then the Π-maximizing MNQ contract induces a declining effort profile (see Lemma E(b)).
In particular, the uniform, exponential, and power-law families of distributions all sat-
isfy the technical conditions required by Lemma E; thus, for all three families of distribu-
tions, the Π-maximizing element in the space of MNQ contract is tenure-track, and induces
a declining profile of effort (see Lemmas F, G, and H). In other words, the conclusions of
Theorem 1 hold for the space of MNQ contracts. Then Proposition 4(b) implies that the
conclusions of Theorem 1 hold for the space of all contracts. Finally, Proposition 3 implies
that the conclusions of Theorem 1 hold for the restricted space of raid-proof contracts; this
establishes Theorem 1.
V Concluding Remarks
This paper provides an explanation of the use of tenure-track contracts in academia that
arises out of the unique nature of academic productivity and optimizing behavior on the
part of the university. The theory, briefly, is that, because a university’s mission involves
encouraging its faculty to engage in research that is important but yields no saleable
results, a professor’s marginal revenue product does not depend simply on her current
research production. Rather, because her research accomplishments act as a signal of
knowledge that serves to attract tuition-paying students, a professor’s contribution to
the university’s revenues, at any point in her career, will depend on the strength of her
cumulative research record. The university then profits by dismissing a professor who fails
to establish a strong research record initially, but by retaining a professor who establishes
a strong record regardless of her research output thereafter.
The theory further provides an explanation for the observation that academic research
production declines, on average, with age. The intuition is simple: because the university’s
opportunities to realize tuition revenues from a professor’s spot research accomplishments
diminish as she approaches the end of her career, the optimal level of induced research
effort, and therefore the expected level of research output, diminishes with age.
Tenure, of course, does not amount to absolute job security. As noted in the Introduc-
tion, while tenured professors are not dismissed for poor research productivity, they will
be dismissed for failing to perform their teaching duties. Our theory provides a simple
explanation: the past research accomplishments of a tenured professor can be translated
into the tuition revenues necessary to make her profitable only if she continues to teach.
The theory serves to correct some common misperceptions. In particular, our analysis
shows that research production does not fall with age because tenure undermines incen-
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tives, and tenure itself is not a measure of security that a university concedes in lieu of
compensation or with reluctance to a powerful faculty union.
The most important implication of our theory is that the tolerance for research failure
that characterizes tenure is consistent with a university’s interest in advancing knowledge
through the research production. Although it might seem that a university could produce
more research by replacing any unproductive scholar, or by providing older professors with
greater research incentives, our analysis suggests that the gain in research output would
be short-lived. By deviating from its profit-maximizing rule, the university’s long-term
viability would be undermined.
Similarly, if, under the pressure of system-wide funding constraints, universities as a
group were to abolish tenure or adopt post-tenure reviews, our analysis suggests that an
efficiency loss would result as the full value of past research accomplishments would go
unrealized.
One final comment should be made regarding our model’s prediction that a university
will adopt tenure-track contracts exclusively. After all, in practice, a university typically
hires some faculty on tenure-track while hiring others on a limited-term basis. How can
this observed contractual mix be reconciled with our result? Our assumption regarding
the translation of a professor’s current research output into future tuition revenues is itself
based on the implicit assumption that there will exist future demand for the university’s
instruction. Under these conditions, the tenure-track contract is optimal. But if the
university was uncertain as to whether some portion of its current enrollment level would
continue into the future, a limited-term hire could be used to meet that portion of current
demand without any long-term commitment.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2. Let Π be the expected profit per period under C, as defined in
eqn.(19). Let Π˜ be the expected profit per period under C˜. Then clearly
Π = R− C and Π˜ = R˜− C˜, (2.1)
where R and R˜ represent the university’s expected revenue per period under the two
contracts, while C and C˜ represent the university’s expected costs per period.
(Eq1) implies that the professor will exhibit the same probability distribution of research
outputs; in particular she will have the same expected values R∗1 := R(e
∗
1, s1) and R
∗
2 :=
R(e∗2, s2). Then (Eq2) implies she will have the same retention probabilities (p1, p2)
in both contracts. Thus equation (17) says both contracts have the same stationary
probability distribution (pi1, pi2, pi3) over the three periods. Thus, both contracts generate
the same expected revenue per period, namely
R˜ = pi1 · 0 + pi2 · k R∗1 + pi3 · k (R∗1 +R∗2) = R. (2.2)
Let S1, S2, S3 denote the professor’s expected salaries in the three periods, under C.
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Then C is simply the professor’s expected salary per period, namely:
C = pi1S1 + pi2S2 + pi3S3 (17)
S1 + p1(S2 + p2S3)
1 + p1 + p1p2
=
S
1 + p1 + p1p2
,
where S := S1 +p1(S2 +p2S3) is the professor’s expected lifetime salary in C. Likewise,
C˜ := S˜/(1 + p1 + p1p2), where S˜ is the professor’s lifetime salary in C˜. The professor’s
expected lifetime net benefit under the two contracts can be expressed by
NB1,2,3 = S − (e∗1)2 − p1 · (e∗2)2 and N˜B1,2,3 = S˜ − (e∗1)2 − p1 · (e∗2)2.
But (Eq3) says N˜B1,2,3 = NB1,2,3; hence S˜ = S; hence C˜ = C. Combining this with
equations (2.1) and (2.2), we get Π˜ = Π. 2
Proof of Proposition 3. Let (e∗1, e
∗
2) be the utility-maximizing effort profile for C. Let
r∗1 := r(e
∗
1) and r
∗
2 := r(e
∗
2). If C˜ is equivalent to C, then (e
∗
1, e
∗
2) will also be the utility-
maximizing effort profile for C˜ (we will ensure this later). In that case, the expected
profit of C˜ before each period will be given by:
Π1 (13) −w1 − b1r∗1;
Π2(r1) (14) −w2 − b2r∗2 + (k − b21)r1;
and Π3(r1, r2) (15) −w3 + (k − b31)r1 + (k − b32)r2.
To make C˜ raid-proof, it suffices to ensure that Π3(r1, r2) = Π2(r1) = Π1 for all r1, r2 ≥ 0.
To do this, we must set
b21 := b31 := b32 := k; (3.1)
w3 := w1 + b1r
∗
1; and (3.2)
w2 := w1 + b1r
∗
1 − b2r∗2. (3.3)
The net benefit of contract C˜ for the professor during period 3 is then
N˜B3(r1, r2) = w3 + kr1 + kr2, by (5) and (3.1). (3.4)
At the beginning of period 2, the value of r1 is known, and the expected future value of
N˜B3, as a function of e2, is given:
N˜B3(r1, e2) (3.4) w3 + kr1 + kr(e2). (3.5)
Let N˜B2,3 be the net benefit of C˜ at the start of period 2 (including the anticipated
future benefit of period 3). By hypothesis, C is tenure-track (i.e. p2 = 1); hence, to be
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equivalent, C˜ must also be tenure-track. In this case, the expected value of N˜B2,3 at the
beginning of period 2, as a function of e2, is given:
N˜B2,3(r1, e2) (7) N˜B2(r1, e2) + N˜B3(r1, e2)
(8,3.1)
w2 + b2r(e2) + kr1 + N˜B3(r1, e2)− e22
(3.5)
(w2 + w3) + 2k r1 + (k + b2)r(e2)− e22
(3.2,3.3)
2w1 + 2b1r
∗
1 − b2r∗2 + 2k r1 + (k + b2)r(e2)− e22. (3.6)
Let s1 be the period 1 standard of C (and hence, of C˜). If the professor exerts effort e1
during period 1, and is retained during period 2, then the conditionally expected value
of r1, given this information, is R(e1) := R(e, s1) [see eqn.(4)]. Thus, the expected future
value of N˜B2,3 at the beginning of period 1, as a function of e1 and e2, is given:
N˜B2,3(e1, e2) (3.6) 2w1 + 2b1r
∗
1 − b2r∗2 + 2k R(e1) + (k + b2)r(e2)− e22. (3.7)
Let N˜B1,2,3 be the lifetime net benefit of C˜ at the start of period 1 (including the
anticipated potential future benefits in periods 2 and 3). For any e ≥ 0, let P (e) :=
p(e, s1) [see eqn.(4)]. Thus, the expected value of N˜B1,2,3, as a function of e1 and e2, is
N˜B1,2,3(e1, e2) (10,11) w1 + b1r(e1) + P (e1) · N˜B2,3(e1, e2)− e21
(3.7)
w1 + b1r(e1) + P (e1)
(
2w1 + 2b1r
∗
1 − b2r∗2 + 2k R(e1) + (k + b2)r(e2)− e22
)
− e21
=
(
1 + 2P (e1)
)
w1 + b1r(e1)− e21
+ P (e1)
(
2b1r
∗
1 − b2r∗2 + 2k R(e1) + (k + b2)r(e2)− e22
)
. (3.8)
Let p1 := P (e
∗
1, s1) and let R
∗
1 := R(e
∗
1). If the professor exerted effort profile (e
∗
1, e
∗
2),
then the expected lifetime net benefit of C˜ would be
N˜B1,2,3(e
∗
1, e
∗
2)
(3.8)
(
1 + 2P (e∗1)
)
w1 + b1r(e
∗
1)− (e∗1)2
+ P (e∗1)
(
2b1r
∗
1 − b2r∗2 + 2k R(e∗1) + (k + b2)r(e∗2)− (e∗2)2
)
= (1 + 2p1)w1 + b1r
∗
1 − (e∗1)2 + p1
(
2b1r
∗
1 + 2k R
∗
1 + kr
∗
2 − (e∗2)2
)
. (3.9)
The expected lifetime net benefit offered by contract C is NB1,2,3 = 0, because C is
admissible by hypothesis. We must also make N˜B1,2,3 = 0. For any values of b1 and b2,
we can achieve this by setting
w1 = w1(b1) :=
−b1r∗1 − p1
(
2b1r
∗
1 + 2k R
∗
1 + kr
∗
2 − (e∗2)2
)
+ (e∗1)
2
1 + 2p1
. (3.10)
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At this point, C˜ has only two free parameters: b1 and b2. Substituting eqn.(3.10) into
(3.7) and (3.8), we define, for all b1, b2 ∈ R, the functions
N˜B2,3(b1, b2; e1, e2)
:= 2w1(b1) + 2b1r
∗
1 − b2r∗2 + 2k R(e1) + (k + b2)r(e2)− e22, and (3.11)
N˜B1,2,3(b1, b2; e1, e2) :=
(
1 + 2P1(e1)
)
w1(b1) + b1r(e1)− e21
+P (e1)
(
2b1r
∗
1 − b2r∗2 + 2k R(e1) + (k + b2)r(e2)− e22
)
. (3.12)
Now we must choose b1, b2 so that the effort profile (e
∗
1, e
∗
2) is still optimal for the professor
under contract C˜. That is, we must ensure that
∂e2 N˜B2,3(b1, b2; e
∗
1, e
∗
2) = 0 and ∂e1 N˜B1,2,3(b1, b2; e
∗
1, e
∗
2) = 0; (3.13)
Differentiating eqn.(3.11) we get ∂e2 N˜B2,3(b1, b2; e
∗
1, e
∗
2) = (k+ b2)r
′(e∗2)−2e∗2. Thus, we
have ∂e2 N˜B2,3(b1, b2; e
∗
1, e
∗
2) = 0 if and only if
b2 =
2e∗2
r′(e∗2)
− k. (3.14)
Differentating eqn.(3.12), we get a (complicated) expression for ∂e1 N˜B2,3(b1, b2; e
∗
1, e
∗
2).
Solving for b1 to satisfy eqn.(3.13), we get
b1 =
B
r′(e∗1) (2 p1 + 1)
, (3.15)
where B := 4P ′(e∗1)p1 kR
∗
1 + 2P
′(e∗1)p1 kr
∗
2 − 2P ′(e∗1)p1 (e∗2)2 − 2P ′(e∗1)(e∗1)2 + 2 e∗1 +
4 e∗1p1+P
′(e∗1) b2 r
∗
2 +2P
′(e∗1) b2 r
∗
2 p1−2P ′(e∗1)kR(e∗1)−4P ′(e∗1)kR(e∗1)p1−P ′(e∗1)r(e∗2)k−
2P ′(e∗1)r(e
∗
2)kp1 − P ′(e∗1)r(e∗2) b2 − 2P ′(e∗1)r(e∗2) b2 p1 + P ′(e∗1)(e∗2)2 + 2P ′(e∗1)(e∗2)2p1 −
2P (e∗1)kR
′
(e∗1)− 4P (e∗1)kR′(e∗1)p1.
Proof of contract equivalence. The expressions (3.14) and (3.15) are well-defined because
r′(e∗2) 6= 0 and r′(e∗1) 6= 0 by hypothesis. If we define b1 and b2 as in (3.14) and (3.15),
then the equations (3.13) hold, so the professor’s optimal effort profile is (e∗1, e
∗
2), as
desired. Thus, condition (Eq1) is satisfied. If we then substitute the value of w1(b1)
from eqn.(3.10) into expression (3.9), we will get N˜B1,2,3 = 0 = NB1,2,3; thus, condition
(Eq3) is satisfied. Condition (Eq2) is satisfied automatically because we have assumed
that both C and C˜ have the same value for s1, and set s2 = 0.
Proof that C˜ is admissible. C˜ satisfies (12) because C does, by condition (Eq3). Now,
C also satisfies the ‘no quitting’ constraints (6) and (9), so NB2,3 ≥ 0 and NB3 ≥ 0;
thus, it suffices to show that N˜B2,3 ≥ NB2,3 and N˜B3 ≥ NB3. To do this, first note that
(5) implies
N˜B3 − NB3 = S˜3 − S3. (3.16)
Also, C˜ and C induce the same effort profile (e∗1, e
∗
2); thus, the professor experiences the
same disutility of effort (e∗2)
2 in period 2 of both contracts; thus, equation (8) implies
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that N˜B2 − NB2 = S˜2 − S2. Furthermore, p2 = 1 in both contracts; thus, equation (7)
implies that
N˜B2,3−NB2,3 = (N˜B2−NB2)+(N˜B3−NB3) (3.16) (S˜2−S2)+(S˜3−S3). (3.17)
Lemma 2 says Π = Π˜. But C˜ is raid-proof, while C was not. This means we must have
Π˜1 ≥ Π1, while Π˜2 ≤ Π2 and Π˜3 ≤ Π3. Since both contracts yield the same expected
revenue (2.2) in each period, this can only mean that S˜2 ≥ S2 and S˜3 ≥ S3. Substituting
this into equations (3.16) and (3.17) yields N˜B3−NB3 ≥ 0 and N˜B2,3−NB2,3 ≥ 0; hence
C˜ satisfies (6) and (9). 2
To prove Proposition 4, we need the following lemma.
Lemma A Suppose contract C satisfies minimal recruitment condition (12) and constraint
(MNQ), and suppose {ρe}e∈R 6− satisfies (B). Define  := β−1 : (0,∞)−→(0,∞).
(a) The professor’s optimal effort profile is given by e∗1 = (b1) and e
∗
2 = (b2).
(b) Let ω(b) := (b)2 − b r[(b)]. Then C must have b12 = b13 = b23 = w3 = 0,
w2 = ω(b2), and w1 = ω(b1).
Proof: Hypothesis (B) implies β is invertible. Examining eqn.(5) reveals that, to make
NB3 = 0 for all r1, r2 ≥ 0, we must set b13 := b23 := w3 := 0. We then have
NB2,3(r1, e2) (7) NB2(r1, e2) (8) w2 + b2r(e2) + b21r1 − e22.
Thus, the optimal effort e∗2 is the solution to the equation b2r
′(e2) = 2e2. It is easy to
check that e∗2 := (b2) is the unique solution to this equation. To ensure that NB2 = 0
for all r1 ≥ 0, we must then set b21 := 0 and set w2 = ω(b2). We then have
NB1,2,3(e1, e
∗
2) (10) NB1(e1) (11) w1 + b1r(e1)− e21.
Thus, e∗1 is the solution to the equation b1r
′(e1) = 2e1; again, the unique solution is
e∗1 := (b1). If we finally set w1 = ω(b1), then we satisfy (12). 2
Proof of Proposition 4. (a) Suppose C has optimal effort profile (e∗1, e
∗
2) and standards
(s1, s2). Let C˜ have the same standards (s1, s2) (so that (Eq2) is satisfied), and set
b1 := β(e
∗
1), b2 := β(e
∗
2), b12 = b13 = b23 = w3 = 0, w2 = ω(b2), and w1 = ω(b1). Lemma
A says that C˜ is a MNQ contract which also has optimal effort profile (e∗1, e
∗
2). Thus,
(Eq1) is satisfied. Lemma A also says that C˜ satisfies (12); thus (Eq3) is satisfied.
(b) If C is the globally Π-maximizing contract, then part (a) yields an MNQ contract
C˜ which is equivalent to C, hence yields the same value of Π (by Lemma 2), hence is
also Π-maximixing. If C satisfies (12), then so does C˜, by (Eq3). Finally, any MNQ
contract automatically satisfies (6) and (9); thus, C˜ is admissible. 2
18
For any e ≥ 0, define Pe(s) := P (e, s). Then Pe : [0,∞)−→(0, 1] is a strictly decreasing
bijection; hence invertible. Define ς(e, p) := P−1e (p). It is easy to prove the next result.
Lemma B For any e1, e2 ≥ 0 and p1, p2 ∈ [0, 1], we can achieve the effort profile (e1, e2)
and retention probabilities (p1, p2) with the MNQ contract (b1, b2; s1, s2) defined by bk =
β(ek) and sk = ς(ek, pk). 2
If b12 = b13 = b23 = w3 = 0, with w2 = ω(b2), and w1 = ω(b1) as specified in Lemma A,
and b1, b2, s1 and s2 are as specified in Lemma B, then equations (18) become:
Π1(e1, e2; p1, p2) = −e21;
Π2(e1, e2; p1, p2) = k R˜(e1, p1)− e22;
and Π3(e1, e2; p1, p2) = k R˜(e1, p1) + k R˜(e2, p2),
(B.1)
where R˜(e, p) := R[e, ς(e, p)]. Substituting (B.1) and (17) into (19), the expected profit
for the University is given by
Π(e1, e2; p1, p2) =
−e21 + p1
(
−e22 + k R˜(e1, p1)
)
+ p1p2k
(
R˜(e1, p1) + R˜(e2, , p2)
)
1 + p1 + p1p2
.
(B.2)
Lemma C Assume hypothesis (B). For any p ∈ [0, 1] and e > 0, define γp(e) := e/∂1 R˜(e, p).
Suppose that, for all p ∈ [0, 1], the function γp : R6−−→R6− is bijective.
(a) For any fixed (p1, p2), the values of (e1, e2) which maximize the value of Π(e1, e2; p1, p2)
are given by
e∗1(p1, p2) := γ
−1
p1
(
k p1(1 + p2)
2
)
and e∗2(p2) := γ
−1
p2
(
k p2
2
)
. (C.1)
(b) In particular, suppose R˜(e, p) = eL(p) for some function L : [0, 1]−→R+. Then
e∗1(p1, p2) = L(p1) k p1(1 + p2)/2 and e
∗
2(p2) = L(p2) k p2/2.
Proof: (a) Differentiating (B.2) we get
∂e1 Π(e1, e2; p1, p2) =
−2e1 + k (p1 + p1p2) ∂1 R˜(e1, p1)
1 + p1 + p1p2
and ∂e2 Π(e1, e2; p1, p2) =
−2p1e2 + k p1p2 ∂1 R˜(e2, p2)
1 + p1 + p1p2
.
To make the numerators of these expressions zero, we need
e1
∂1 R˜(e1, p1)
=
k (p1 + p1p2)
2
and
e2
∂1 R˜(e2, p2)
=
k p2
2
,
which is achieved by eqn.(C.1).
(b) If R˜(e, p) = eL(p), then ∂1 R˜(e, p) = L(p), so γp(e) = e/L(p), so γ
−1
p (x) = L(p)x.
Now apply part (a). 2
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If the hypotheses of Lemma C are satisfied, then the Π-maximization problem is reduced
to finding the (p1, p2) ∈ [0, 1]2 which maximize the function
Πˆ(p1, p2) := Π[e
∗
1(p1, p2), e
∗
2(p1, p2); p1, p2]. (C.2)
The family of distributions {ρe}e∈R 6− is tenable if it satisfies two conditions:
(T1) R(e, s) = c1e+ c2s for some constants c1, c2 ∈ R+.
(T2) ς(e, p) = e S(p) for some function S : [0, 1]−→R+, with S(1) = 0.
‘Tenability’ is a technical condition with no obvious economic interpretation. However, we
will later see that all three distribution families in Theorem 1 are tenable.
Lemma D Suppose {ρe}e∈R 6− is tenable. Then hypothesis (B) holds. Define L(p) := c1 +
c2 S(p). Then R˜(e, p) = eL(p), so Lemma C(b) applies. Furthermore,
Πˆ(p1, p2) =
k2 p1
4
(
p1L(p1)
2(1 + p2)
2 + L(p2)
2p22
1 + p1 + p1p2
)
. (D.1)
Thus,
∂2 Πˆ(p1, p2) =
k2 p1 Ξ(p1, p2)
4(1 + p1 + p1p2)2
, where (D.2)
Ξ(p1, p2) := 2(1 + p1 + p1p2)
(
p1 L(p1)
2(1 + p2) + L(p2)L
′(p2)p22 + L(p2)
2p2
)
(D.3)
−p1
(
p1L(p1)
2(1 + p2)
2 + L(p2)
2p22
)
.
Proof: For any e ≥ 0, we have r(e) = R(e, 0)
(T1)
c1e; thus, r
′(e) = c1 > 0 is constant, so
β(e) := 2e/r′(e) = 2e/c1 satisfies condition (B). Now,
R˜(e, p) = R[e, ς(e, p)]
(T1)
c1e+ c2ς(e, p) (T2) c1e+ c2e S(p)
= e(c1 + c2S(p)) = eL(p). (D.4)
Equation (D.4) means that Lemma C(b) is applicable, so the functions e∗1(p1, p2) and
e∗2(p2) are well-defined. We define
R̂1(p1, p2) := R˜[e
∗
1(p1, p2), p1] (D.4) e
∗
1(p1, p2)L(p1), (D.5)
and R̂2(p2) := R˜[e
∗
2(p2), p2] (D.4) e
∗
2(p2)L(p2). (D.6)
Substitute (B.2), (D.5) and (D.6) into (C.2) to obtain
Πˆ(p1, p2) =
−e∗1(p1, p2)2 + p1
(
−e∗2(p2)2 + k R̂1(p1, p2)
)
+ k p1p2
(
R̂1(p1, p2) + R̂2(p2)
)
1 + p1 + p1p2
=
kp1(1 + p2)R̂1(p1, p2)− e∗1(p1, p2)2
1 + p1 + p1p2
+ p1
(
kp2R̂2(p2)− e∗2(p2)2
1 + p1 + p1p2
)
. (D.7)
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Now,
kp1(1 + p2)R̂1(p1, p2)− e∗1(p1, p2)2 (D.5) kp1(1 + p2) e∗1(p1, p2)L(p1)− e∗1(p1, p2)2
(∗) k
2p21(1 + p2)
2L(p1)
2/2− k2p21(1 + p2)2L(p1)2/4
= k2p21(1 + p2)
2L(p1)
2/4. (D.8)
and kp2R̂2(p2)− e∗2(p2)2 (D.6) kp2 e∗2(p2)L(p2)− e∗2(p2)2
(∗) L(p2)
2 k2 p22/2− L(p2)2 k2 p22/4
= L(p2)
2 k2 p22/4. (D.9)
where (∗) is Lemma C(b). Substituting (D.8) and (D.9) into (D.7) we get
Πˆ(p1, p2) =
k2p21(1 + p2)
2L(p1)
2 + p1L(p2)
2 k2 p22
4(1 + p1 + p1p2)
,
which we factor to obtain (D.1). Differentiating (D.1) yields (D.2). 2
Lemma E Suppose {ρe}e∈R 6− is tenable, and let Ξ be as in equation (D.3).
(a) Suppose Ξ(p1, p2) ≥ 0 for all (p1, p2) ∈ [0, 1]2. Then the Π-maximizing MNQ
contract is tenure-track (i.e. p∗2 = 1).
(b) In this case e∗1 = k(c1 + c2S(p
∗
1))p
∗
1 and e
∗
2 = kc1/2. Thus, if S(p1) > c1(1 −
2p1)/2c2p1 then the Π-maximizing MNQ contract induces a declining effort profile
(i.e. e∗1 > e
∗
2). In particular, if p
∗
1 > 1/2, then e
∗
1 > e
∗
2.
Proof: Part (a) follows immediately from eqn.(D.2). Part (b) follows by substituting p∗2 = 1
into Lemma C(b); note that L(1) = c1 + c2S(1) = c1, because S(1) = 0. 2
We are now in a position to prove the equivalent of Theorem 1 in the restricted setting
onf MNQ contracts. This is the content of the next three lemmas.
Lemma F Suppose {ρe}e∈R 6− is the family of uniform distributions from Theorem 1(a).
Then the Π-maximizing MNQ contract is tenure-track, with a declining effort profile.
Proof: For all 0 ≤ s ≤ e we have P (e, s) = (e − s)/e; hence ς(e, p) = e(1 − p). Also,
R(e, s) = (e + s)/2. Thus, setting c1 = c2 =
1
2
and S(p) = 1 − p, we see that {ρe} is
tenable, so we can apply Corollary E. We have L(p) = (2−p)/2 in Lemma D. Substitute
this expression for L(p) into eqn.(D.3) to get Ξ(p1, p2) = f(p1, p2)/4, where
f(p1, p2) := 16 p1p2 + 8 p1 + 8 p2 − 12 p22 − 6 p31p2 − 4 p21 − 2 p31 + 4 p32 − 8 p1p22
+ 4 p21p
2
2 − 4 p31p22 + 2 p41p2 + p41p22 + p41 − 4 p1p32 + 3 p1p42.
Claim 1: f(p1, p2) ≥ 0 for all (p1, p2) ∈ [0, 1]2.
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Proof: Let
g(p1, p2) := 16 p1p2 + 8 p1 + 8 p2 − 12 p22 − 6 p11p2 − 4 p11 − 2 p11 + 4 p32 − 8 p1p22
+ 4 p21p
2
2 − 4 p21p22 + 2 p41p2 + p41p22 + p41 − 4 p1p22 + 3 p1p42
= 10 p1p2 + 2 p1 + 8 p2 − 12 p22 + 4 p32 − 12 p1p22 + 2 p41p2 + p41p22 + p41 + 3 p1p42.
Claim 1.1: g(p1, p2) ≤ f(p1, p2), for all (p1, p2) ∈ [0, 1]2.
Proof: Suppose 0 < n < m. If 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 then xn ≥ xm; hence −xn ≤ −xm.
We obtained g(p1, p2) by taking the expression for f(p1, p2) and decreasing the
exponents on the underlined negative terms. Each of these terms is made smaller
by this change (by previous paragraph); thus, g(p1, p2) ≤ f(p1, p2). O Claim 1.1
Claim 1.2: ∂1 g(p1, p2) ≥ 0 for all (p1, p2) ∈ [0, 1]2.
Proof: ∂1 g(p1, p2) = (8 p2 + 4 p
2
2 + 4) p
3
1+10 p2+2−12 p22+3 p42. Thus, ∂1 g(p1, p2) < 0
if and only if −p31 > h(p2), where
h(p2) :=
2 + 10 p2 − 12 p22 + 3 p42
8 p2 + 4 p22 + 4
.
The denominator of h(p2) is clearly positive for p2 ∈ [0, 1]. The numerator of h(p2)
is H(p2) := 2 + 10 p2−12 p22 + 3 p42. It suffices to show that H(p2) ≥ 0 for p2 ∈ [0, 1].
But H ′(p2) = 10 − 24 p2 + 12 p32 has only one root in [0, 1], which corresponds
to a (positive) maximum of H. Thus, H has no interior minima in [0, 1]. Now,
H(0) = 2 > 0 and H(1) = 3 > 0; thus, H(p2) > 0 for all p2 ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, h(p2) > 0
for all p2 ∈ [0, 1], so it is impossible for −p31 > h(p2) (because p1 > 0). Thus,
∂1 g(p1, p2) ≥ 0. O Claim 1.2
Claim 1.3: g(p1, p2) ≥ 0 for all (p1, p2) ∈ [0, 1]2.
Proof: Claim 1.2 implies that g(p1, p2) is increasing in p1; thus, it suffices to check
that g(0, p2) ≥ 0 for all p2 ∈ [0, 1]. But g(0, p2) = G(p2) := 8 p2− 12 p22 + 4 p32. Now,
G′(p2) = 8 − 24 p2 + 12 p22 has roots 1 ±
√
3/3. Only one of these roots is in [0, 1],
and it corresponds to a maximum of G. Also, G(0) = 0 = G(1). Thus, G(p2) ≥ 0
for all p2 ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, g(p1, p2) ≥ 0 for all (p1, p2) ∈ [0, 1]2. O Claim 1.3
Claims 1.1 and 1.3 together imply that f(p1, p2) ≥ 0 for all (p1, p2) ∈ [0, 1]2. 3 Claim 1
Claim 1 and Corollary E(a) imply that the Π-maximizing contract is tenure-track. It
remains to demonstrate the declining effort profile. The maximum of Πˆ occurs along the
boundary p2 = 1. Thus, to identify p
∗
1, it suffices to maximize
Υ(p1) :=
Πˆ(p1, 1)
k2 (D.1)
p (16 p− 16 p2 + 4 p3 + 1)
16(1 + 2 p)
The zeros of
Υ′(p1) =
32 p1 + 1 + 24 p
4
1 − 48 p31 − 16 p21
16 (1 + 2 p1)
2
22
are the zeros of the numerator 32 p1 + 1 + 24 p
4
1−48 p31−16 p21. Only one of these zeros is
in the interval [0, 1]; it is located at p∗1 ≈ 0.8422568359, and corresponds to a maximum
of Υ. Since p∗1 > 1/2, Corollary E(b) implies that e
∗
1 > e
∗
2. 2
Lemma G Suppose {ρe}e∈R 6− is the family of exponential distributions from Theorem 1(b).
Then the Π-maximizing MNQ contract is tenure-track, with a declining effort profile.
Proof: We have P (e, s) = exp(−s/e), so ς(e, p) = −e ln(p). Also, R(e, s) = e + s. Setting
S(p) = − ln(p) and c1 = c2 = 1, we see that {ρe}e∈R 6− is tenable; thus, we can apply
Corollary E. In Lemma D, we have L(p) = (1− ln(p)). Substitute into (D.3) to get
Ξ(p1, p2) = λ(p1, p2) + p1g(p1, p2), (G.1)
where g(p1, p2) := 2− p22 + p1 + 2 p2 + 2 p1p2 + p1p22,
and
λ(p1, p2) :=
(
2 p1 + p
2
1 + p
2
1p
2
2 + 2 p1p2 + 2 p
2
1p2
)
ln (p1)
2 +
(
p1p
2
2 + 2 p1p2 + 2 p2
)
ln (p2)
2
− (4 p1 + 4 p1p2 + 4 p21p2 + 2 p21 + 2 p21p22) ln (p1) − (2 p1p2 + 2 p2) ln (p2) .
Claim 1: Ξ(p1, p2) > 0 for all (p1, p2) ∈ [0, 1]2.
Proof: λ(p1, p2) ≥ 0 for all (p1, p2) ∈ [0, 1]2, because ln(x)2 ≥ 0 for all x > 0, and
− ln(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ (0, 1]. Thus, it suffices to show g(p1, p2) > 0. Let h(p2) :=
−p22 + 2p2 + 2.
Claim 1.1: g(p1, p2) > h(p2) for all p1, p2 > 0.
Proof: Write g(p1, p2) as polynomial in p2 to get: g(p1, p2) = (−1 + p1) p22+(2 + 2 p1) p2+
2 + p1. If p1 > 0, then −1 + p1 > −1, 2 + 2p1 > 2 and 2 + p1 > 2. Thus, each
p2-coefficient of g(p1, p2) is strictly larger than the corresponding coefficient of h(p2),
for any p1 > 0. Thus, g(p1, p2) > h(p2) for all p1, p2 > 0. O Claim 1.1
Now, h(0) = 2 > 0, h(1) = 3 > 0, and h has no extremal points in [0, 1]; thus h(p2) > 0
for all p2 ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, Claim 2.1 implies that g(p1, p2) > 0 for all (p1, p2) ∈ [0, 1]2.
Thus, eqn.(G.1) implies that Ξ(p1, p2) ≥ 0 for all (p1, p2) ∈ [0, 1]2, as desired. 3 Claim 1
Claim 2 and Corollary E(a) imply that the Π-maximizing contract is tenure-track. It
remains to demonstrate the declining effort profile. The maximum of Πˆ occurs along the
boundary p2 = 1. Thus, to identify p
∗
1, it suffices to maximize
Υ(p1) :=
Πˆ(p1, 1)
k2 (D.1)
p1
(
4 p1 − 8 p1 ln (p1) + 4 p1 ln (p1)2 + 1
)
4(1 + 2 p1)
.
The zeros of
Υ′(p1) =
−8 p1 ln (p1) + 8 p1 ln (p1)2 + 8 p21 ln (p1)2 + 1− 8 p21
4 (1 + 2 p1)
2
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are the zeros of the numerator −8 p1 ln (p1)+8 p1 ln (p1)2+8 p21 ln (p1)2+1−8 p21. This is a
transcendental function, and it is not possible to find closed-form expressions for its zeros.
However, numerically, the numerator has only one zero, located at p∗1 ≈ 0.7121849555;
this corresponds to the unique maximum of Υ(p1). Since p
∗
1 > 1/2, Corollary E(b)
implies that e∗1 > e
∗
2. 2
Lemma H For any α > 1, let {ραe }e∈R 6− be the family of power law distributions from
Theorem 1(c). There exist α, α ∈ (1,∞) such that, if α ∈ (1, α) or α ∈ (α,∞), then the
Π-maximizing MNQ contract is tenure-track, with a declining effort profile. In particular,
this holds if α = 2.
Proof: For any α > 1, we have Pα(e, s) =
(
e
e+s
)α
; thus ςα(e, p) = e(p
−1/α − 1). Also,
Rα(e, s) =
e+αs
α−1 . Thus, setting Sα(p) := (p
−1/α−1), c1 = 1/(α−1) and c2 = α/(α−1),
we see that {ραe }e∈R 6− is tenable. In Lemma D, we have
Lα(p) =
αp−1/α
(α− 1) − 1 thus L
′
α(p) =
−1
(α− 1) pα+1α .
Substituting into eqn.(D.3) we get Ξα(p1, p2) = ξ(p1, p2)/(α − 1)2, where ξ(p1, p2) :=
2 p1 +2 p2−4 pa−4 p2a−2 p1p
α−2
α
2 α+p
2
1 +4 p
2α−1
α
1 ap2 +2 p
2α−1
α
1 p
2
2α+4 p1p2 +p1p
2 α−1
α
2 α
2−
2 p
α−2
α
2 α−4 p
α−1
α
2 α
2+p1p
2
2+2 p1p
α−2
α
2 α
2+6 p1p
α−1
α
2 α+2 p
α−2
α
1 α
2+2 p
α−2
α
1 α
2p2+p
2
1p
2
2+4 p
α−1
α
1 α−
2 p
2α−1
α
1 α
2 + 2α2p2 + p
2 α−1
α
1 p
2
2α
2 + 4 p1α
2p2 − 8 p1p2a + 2 p1α2 − 2 p1p
α−1
α
2 − 4 p
α−1
α
1 α
2p2 −
4 p
2α−1
α
1 α
2p2 +p
2 α−1
α
1 α
2 +2 p
2α−1
α
1 α−2 p1p
2α−1
α
2 −2 p
α−1
α
2 +2 p
α−2
α
2 α
2 +6 p
α−1
α
2 α+4 p1p
2α−1
α
2 α+
2 p21p2 +p1α
2p22−2 pap22−2 p
2α−1
α
1 p
2
2α
2 +2 p
2 α−1
α
1 α
2p2−2 p1p
2α−1
α
2 α
2−2 p1p2
α−1
α
2 α−2 p21α+
2 p21α
2p2 − 4 p21p2a+ p21p22α2 − 2 p21p22α+ p21α2 − 4 p1p
α−1
α
2 α
2 + 4 p
α−1
α
1 ap2 − 4 p
α−1
α
1 α
2. Thus,
it suffices to show that ξα(p1, p2) > 0 for all (p1, p2) ∈ [0, 1]2. As promised in Theorem
1(b), we consider only the asymptotics as α↘ 1 or α→∞.
Asymptotics as α↘ 1. We have
lim
α↘1
ξα(p1, p2) = ξ1(p1, p2) := (1− p1) + 2 p2 + p22 + 2
p2
p1
+
2
p1
. (H.1)
Now, ξ1(p1, p2) is positive for all (p1, p2) ∈ [0, 1]2, because (1 − p1) ≥ 0 if p1 ≤ 1, and
all the other terms in expression (H.1) are nonegative. Thus, if α is small enough, then
ξα(p1, p2) > 0 for all (p1, p2) ∈ [0, 1]2; hence Corollary E(a) implies that the Π-maximizing
contract is tenure-track.
Indeed, if α = 2, we have ξ2(p1, p2) = 12−6√p2 + 10 p2−8 p3/21 p2−2 p1 p3/22 −8
√
p1p2−
4 p
3/2
1 p
2
2−4 p3/21 −8
√
p1−6 p1√p2+12 p1 p2+5 p1 p22+p21p22+p21+2 p21p2+10 p1. A numerical
plot reveals that 6 < ξ2(p1, p2) < 16 for all (p1, p2) ∈ [0, 1]2. Thus, the Π-maximizing
contract is tenure-track when α = 2.
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It remains to demonstrate the declining effort profile. For all p ∈ [0, 1], we have
lim
α↘1
Sα(p) − c1(1− 2p)
2c2p
=
1
2p
> 0. Thus, if α is small enough, then Corollary
E(b) implies that e∗1 > e
∗
2, as desired.
Asymptotics as α→∞. A computation reveals that lim
α→∞
ξα(p1, p2) = Ξ(p1, p2), where
Ξα(p1, p2) is exactly as in eqn.(G.1) from the exponential case. Thus, Claim 2 implies
that lim
α→∞
ξα(p1, p2) > 0 for all (p1, p2) ∈ [0, 1]2. Thus, if α is sufficiently large, then
Corollary E(a) implies that the Π-maximizing contract is tenure-track.
It remains to demonstrate the declining effort profile. Substituting Lα(p) =
αp−1/α
(α−1) − 1
into eqn.(D.1) and differentiating yields
∂1Πˆα(p1, 1) = k
2 8α
2 fα(p1) + α gα(p1) + hα(p1)
4(α− 1)2(1 + 2 p1)2 , (H.2)
where fα(p) :=
(
p2 + p2−
2
a − 2p2− 1a
)
+
(
p+ p1−
2
a − 2p1− 1a
)
, gα(p) := −16 p2 a−1a −
8 p
a−2
a + 32 p
2 a−1
a + 24 p
a−1
a − 16 p2− 16 p, and hα(p) := 1 + 8 p− 16 p 2 a−1a − 8 pa−1a + 8 p2.
Claim 1: If p ∈ (0, 1), then fα(p) > 0.
Proof: If p ∈ (0, 1) then the function x 7→ px is convex. Thus, px + py > 2p(x+y)/2.
Setting x = 2 and y = 2− 2
α
, we get p2 + p2−
2
a > 2p2−
1
a . Setting x = 1 and y = 1− 2
α
,
we get p1 + p1−
2
a > 2p1−
1
a . Thus, each of the two bracketed terms in fα(p) is strictly
positive; thus fα(p) > 0, as desired. 3 Claim 1
In the limit as α→∞, the term (α−1)2 in the denominator of expression (H.2) annihilates
all terms in the numerator except fα(p). Thus, if α is extremely large, then the sign
of ∂1Πˆα(p1, 1) is the same as the sign of fα(p1), and fα(p1) > 0 by Claim 3. Thus,
∂1Πˆα(p1, 1) > 0 for all p ∈ (0, 1); thus, the optimal value of p1 is p∗1 = 1.
This means that, if α is large enough, then p∗1 > 1/2; thus, Corollary E(b) implies that
e∗1 > e
∗
2, as desired. 2
Proof of Theorem 1. Lemmas F, G, and H state that, under any of the hypotheses (a),
(b) or (c), the Π-maximizing element in the space of MNQ contract is tenure-track, and
induces a declining profile of effort. Thus, by Proposition 4, the same statement is true
for the Π-maximizing element in the space of all contracts. Thus, by Proposition 3, the
same statement is true for the Π-maximizing element in the space of raid-proof contracts.
This proves Theorem 1. 2
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